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ALGERIA

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- I. Algerian rebels making strong bid for backing for UN-conducted referendum to settle Algeria's political future.
 - A. Rebels apparently have abandoned hope that discussions with De Gaulle's aides--broken off at Melun in June--will be resumed or that negotiated settlement at all possible.
 1. Have expressed embitterment that US has not exerted pressure on De Gaulle through NATO to end conflict.
 - B. Rebels reiterate they prepared to accept aid "wherever it can be found." "Premier" Ferhat Abbas' current ostentatious trip to Peiping--his first to bloc area--designed to show West that rebels in earnest. He unlikely to obtain new arms commitment from Communist China, since previous armament commitments apparently have not been delivered. Chinese, however, may offer additional financial aid.
 - C. Increased urban terrorism in Algeria also seems designed to gain maximum publicity.
 - D. Rebel military activities continue to be contained by 500,000 French military employing electrified barriers, cleanup operations in infested sectors, and militarily-controlled pacified areas.
- II. Tunisia and Morocco appear vying with each other to support rebel efforts to involve UN more directly; look on UN's Congo operations as precedent.
 - A. Tunisian President Bourguiba weighing effects of proposed "union" of his government with rebels' provisional regime.

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1. At best, Bourguiba sees "union" as means of breaking French-Algerian deadlock and bringing both to discussion table.
2. At worst, "union" would invite French military incursions on Tunisian soil; whereupon Bourguiba could call for UN intervention to protect him.
3. Bourguiba has agreed to facilitate passage of arms and volunteers for Tunisian-based rebels in spite of fact Algerian presence poses threat to his regime.

B. Morocco's acting deputy premier Torres--senior official in absence of King and Crown Prince--has threatened to order Moroccan army to retaliate in an effort to attract UN attention should French army in Algeria violate Moroccan territory as occurred in two well publicized recent incidents.

1. Such counterattack--reported authorized by King--would be designed to justify call for intervention of UN forces.

III. De Gaulle unlikely to make new move on Algeria prior to UN debate, which now seems likely to occur mid to late November.

- A. De Gaulle's recent press conference and speeches reiterate theme of "Algerian Algeria" based on self-determination, and insistence rebels' terrorism is obstacle to cease-fire negotiations.
- B. Government cracking down on snowballing domestic criticism from both left and right.
- C. Study commissions in France and Algeria, predominantly Moslem, on local Algerian problems--especially economic--are meeting, but effectiveness questionable.

IV. USSR has shifted from policy of neutrality toward Algerian question--adopted mid-1959--in favor pro-rebel line.

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- A. Khrushchev, after meeting Algerian rebel "delegation" to UN at Glen Cove last Sunday, noted rebel government "exists" and that De Gaulle's "negotiations" with rebels were tacit recognition.
 - 1. In contrast with Moscow's past line that negotiations offer best solution, Khrushchev asserted Algerians can achieve results quicker if they "more resolute."
- B. Acting Soviet Premier Kosygin held private talks with rebel "premier" Abbas during transit Moscow last week; Abbas also received by Soviet Foreign Ministry officials.
 - 1. Radio Moscow gave visit wide publicity.
- C. In past Soviet assistance confined to medical and relief supplies through Soviet Red Crescent; Moscow announced in September, "non-governmental" gift of \$500,000 worth of relief commodities from Soviet trade unions to rebels' labor union
- 25X1X6 D. [REDACTED] in Tunis reports that formal Soviet recognition of the Algerian rebel government is imminent. It seems questionable, however, whether USSR willing at this time to commit itself to such an action which would irrevocably alienate the De Gaulle government.
- V. USSR's departure from cautious approach presages strong Communist bloc support in General Assembly for UN-controlled plebiscite.
 - A. Such support would be in line with Khrushchev's all-out attack on "colonialism" and bid to woo uncommitted countries of Africa and Asia by demonstrating community of interests with Communist world.

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- VI. Not yet possible to foresee nature and character of resolution likely to emerge at UNGA this year. Some resolution probably calling for UN-supervised referendum virtually certain.
- A. Algerian UN "delegation" led by hard-line Deputy Premier-Foreign Minister Belkacem Krim likely to want strong resolution. Tunisia's Mongi Slim likely to throw his influence toward a moderate one.
1. Last fall, very moderate Algerian resolution failed of passage by 1 vote.
- B. Not yet certain that enlarged African bloc--increased from 9 to 24 members (25 when Nigeria is admitted as member on Friday)--will fully support any given resolution.
1. Eleven French Community states will be under strong pressure from Paris; probably, however, would defy French threat to cut off economic aid and support call for UN-supervised referendum.